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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
Friday - 6 August 1971

Page 2

6. (Secret - JGO) Met with Mr. Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee, and briefed him on the projections of ICBM deployment along the lines suggested in the OER memorandum of 6 August. Although he accepts the community figures, he is critical of the executive branch attitude toward Soviet weapons development in the light of information available concerning American posture in the SALT talks. I also briefed Mr. Slatinshek on a Soviet naval ballistic missile.

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7. (Secret - GLC) [REDACTED] CI Staff, called to advise that they had no information on any involvement in intelligence activities on the part of [REDACTED] (see Journal of 27 July).

25X1C

8. (Unclassified - RJK) Delivered to the offices of Senators George McGovern (D., S. Dak.) and Clifford Case (R., N.J.) and Representatives Augustus Hawkins (D., Calif.) and Herman Badillo (D., N.Y.) [REDACTED] items in which their names were mentioned.

STATSPEC

[REDACTED]

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Acting Legislative Counsel

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cc:
ER
O/DDCI

[REDACTED]

DDS
DDS&T
Mr. Goodwin
Mr. Houston
EA/DDP
OPPB
DDI
Item 5 - Pers.

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6 August 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Projections of Soviet ICBM Deployment

1. Reports in the *Baltimore Sun* and the *Washington Evening Star* have alledged that the Soviets are deploying the two new types of silos discovered earlier this year at a faster pace than previously estimated. These reports are not accurate.

25X1B 2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] however, it was estimated that the Soviets could start work on 10-20 silos each month. At this pace, the Soviets could have more than 150 silos of both types under way by the end of this year at the complexes where construction was under way or likely to begin. [REDACTED]

25X1B [REDACTED], however, that some 105 to 120 silos probably would be under way by the end of the year.

3. To date, a total of 84 of the two new types of silos have been identified--64 of the smaller type at Pervomaysk and Derazhnaya where MRBM's and IRBM's are deployed and 20 larger type silos at five SS-9 complexes. This deployment rate is well within the previously estimated total for 1971. When work is started on all sites in existing groups, the total is expected to rise to 91--66 at Pervomaysk and Derazhnaya and 25 at the SS-9 complexes. [REDACTED] areas of the new deployment was virtually complete, suggesting that most of the new type silos have been identified. Additional starts could begin at any time and could reach the maximum levels previously estimated.

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4. Construction of standard silos for the SS-11 has halted and only 12 SS-9 and 20 SS-13 silos are still under active construction. When complete, the total number of older type launchers will be 1407--209 for the SS-7 and SS-8, 288 for the SS-9, 850 for the SS-11 and 60 for the SS-13.

These totals have not increased during the past year.

5. It is not yet clear whether the new type silos will increase the aggregate total of Soviet ICBM silos or will replace existing ones. The current judgment is that the smaller silos represent additional Soviet ICBM deployment. The larger silos may also be intended to increase the overall level of Soviet ICBM silos, but it is equally possible that they will replace existing silos for some older systems. Whatever the case, none of the new silos have been included in the present total of Soviet ICBM deployment.

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